Rationality and Irrationality, Man and Gods: Which God(s) Would You Like To Study?
Every time I start an essay on man's rationality,
Or at least his capability for rationality,
I get stuck,
And hit the brakes.
Why?
Because their is much more excitement and drama,
In pursuing man's irrationality...
Or at least his or her seeming irrationality...
However, irrationality is a very relative concept.
Irrationality becomes completely rational,
Or at least understandable,
And maybe sometimes 'bizarrely rational',
As soon as you understand,
Which God a person is worshipping,
Which God a person is pursuing,
Which God a person wants to be.
Which God would you sooner learn about?
Apollo -- the Greek God of rationality and ethics, light, and truth?
Or Dionysus (Nietzsche's infatuation -- and mine) -- the Greek God of pleasure and dance, and wine and group celebration, and sexuality and orgasm...pretty much everything Freud summed up in 'The Id'?
Or Freud's later infatuation: Narcissus -- the God of Ego, and Self-Inflation, and Self-Assertion, and Self-Absorption, and 'Will to Power', and 'Will to Fame and Ambition', and 'Will to Possess and Conquer', and 'Will To Revenge', and 'Will To Selfishness'...
Dionysus and Narcissus usually get along pretty well together...
Even throw Eros and Aphrodite into the mix (God and Goddess of Love and Romance),
And you can still have a pretty good party...
It's Apollo who puts the main damper on things,
God of ethics, morals, integrity...
The other Gods are often looking to transgress...
Such ethics, morals, integrity.
Particularly when it starts to get completely out of hand,
And threatens to run uncontrollably amok,
Throwing chaos into law and order, prim and proper...
Eros and Aprhodite -- these are interesting Gods too...
If you've been hit by the 'love bug',
And can feel that famous 'flutter' in your heart...
Then you are chasing
Eros or Aphrodite -- both Gods of love and romance, male and female version...
In contrast, to the more sensual and sexual 'down-to-earth' agendas of Dionysus and Narcissus.
All three/four may get along fine together...
Or not.
Dionysus and Narcissus don't need to have Eros and Apphrodite...
Join in the festivities...
To still have a great party...
Indeed, sometimes Eros and Aphrodite...
Like Apollo,
Only spoil the party...
Bringing possessiveness and jealousy into or onto the scene...
And anger and aggression, that may come with it...
At which point Narcissus and Dionysus may both say...
Go back home, Eros and Aphrodite!
Your spoiling the party...
Eros/Aphrodite, Dionysus, and Narcissus,
Swarming Together,
To lift us up,
And/or bring us down,
What do we call them?
'The Terrific Threesome'?
Or 'The Terrible Threesome?
Or Both?
Obsession, compulsion, addiction, love, lust, sexuality, rejection, betrayal, abandonment, jealousy, envy, anger, grief, rage, aggression, violence, crimes of passion, crimes of transference, identification, projection, compensation, inferiority feelings, superiority striving, the 'darkness of the shadow', sexual fetishes, power and sex, domination and submission, sadism and masochism, exhibitionism, voyeurism, seduction, manipulation, coercion, force, serial crimes, serial rapes, serial killings...
Who would you sooner learn about?
Apollo?
Or Dionysus, Narcissus, and Eros/Aphrodite?
Wrapped together in one chemically charged package...
Transference. Transference Complexes, Transference Games, The Exciting Object, The Rejecting Object, Narcissitic Traumacies, Narcissistic Compensations, Narcissistic Identifications, Identification with The Aggressor, Identification With The Rejector, Identification With The Abandoner, Identification With The Distancer, Identification With The Betrayor, Identification With The Violator, Identification With The Abuser...
The first God -- Apollo -- was the God of The Enlightenment Period,
But I think you can begin to understand why,
Apollo, by himself, was not enough,
To define or describe or summarize,
Human Behavior...
Enter the Dragon,
The Transference Dragon,
Enter...The last three/four Gods -- Dionysus, Narcissus, Eros/Aphrodite...
Who did much to help describe...
The 'Other Side of Human Nature'...
The darker,
Sexier,
Seedier,
More romantic,
More sensual,
More unpredictable,
Side of human behavior...
Which God(s) would you like to study?
Or would you like to study them all?
Which God are you chasing?
Or are you chasing them all?
-- dgbn, Dec. 17th, 2008, modified and updated Dec. 30th, 2008.
-- David Gordon Bain.
Wednesday, December 17, 2008
Sunday, December 14, 2008
A DGB Analysis of The Evolution of Psychoanalysis..Part 1: Hysteria (Background Material From The Internet)
Part 1: Hysteria and Its Influence on Freud and The Birth of Psychoanalysis
In Freudian Psychology -- i.e., Psychoanalysis -- Freud started out by treating 'hysterical' women -- meaning women who complained of, and/or demonstrated characteristics or 'symptoms' of physical disease, without any doctors being able to find the underylying 'physical causes' or 'roots' of these characteristics/symptoms. Such cases -- rightly or wrongly -- were lumped into the category of 'hysteria' meaning essentially 'case demonstrations of physical disease without the diagnosed underlying physical causes that would normally lead the doctor in the direction of the "cure"'. From the beginning of time practically such diseases have been classified as 'a woman's disease' -- 'hysteria' as it was originally defined (by Hippocrates) meant 'wandering uterus', meaning that it was associated with being a woman, or worse, 'a crazy woman' or 'demonized woman', and throughout the course of history there have been an equally 'crazy and/or not so crazy assortment of "doctor cures" aimed at correcting this diagnosed and/or misdiagnosed 'female problem'...
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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article is about the state of mind. For other uses, see Hysteria (disambiguation).
Hysteria, in its colloquial use, describes a state of mind, one of unmanageable fear or emotional excesses. The fear is often caused by multiple events in one's past that involved some sort of severe conflict; the fear can be centered on a body part or most commonly on an imagined problem with that body part (disease is a common complaint. See also Body dysmorphic disorder and Hypochondriasis. People who are "hysterical" often lose self-control due to the overwhelming fear.
Psychiatrists and other physicians have in theory given up the use of "hysteria", replacing it with more euphemistic terms that are essentially synonyms. These include "psychosomatic", "functional", "nonorganic", "psychogenic", and "medically unexplained". In 1980 the American Psychiatric Association officially changed the diagnosis of "hysterical neurosis, conversion type" to "conversion disorder". Hysteria also has significant overlap with the diagnostic term "somatization disorder" and with somatoform disorders in general.
History
Main article: Female hysteria
The term originates with the Greek medical term, hysterikos. This referred to a medical condition, thought to be particular to women, caused by disturbances of the uterus, hystera in Greek. The term hysteria was coined by Hippocrates, who thought that suffocation and madness arose in women whose uteri had become too light and dry from lack of sexual intercourse and, as a result, wandered upward, compressing the heart, lungs, and diaphragm.
The same general definition, or under the name female hysteria, came into widespread use in the middle and late 19th century to describe what is today generally considered to be sexual dissatisfaction.[1] Typical treatment was massage of the patient's genitalia by the physician and later vibrators or water sprays to cause orgasm.[1] By the early 1900s, the practice and usage of the term had fallen from use until it was again popularized when the writings of Sigmund Freud became known and influential in Britain and the USA in the 1920s. The Freudian psychoanalytic school of psychology uses its own, somewhat controversial, ways to treat hysteria.
The knowledge of hysterical processes was advanced by the work of Jean-Martin Charcot, a French neurologist. However, many now consider hysteria to be a legacy diagnosis (i.e., a catch-all junk diagnosis),[2] particularly due to its long list of possible manifestations: one Victorian physician cataloged 75 pages of possible symptoms of hysteria and called the list incomplete.[3].
Current psychiatric terminology distinguishes two types of hysteria: somatoform and dissociative. Dissociative hysteria includes amnestic fugue states. Somatoform disorders include conversion disorder, somatization disorder, chronic pain disorder, hypochondriasis, and body dysmorphic disorder. In somatoform disorders, the patient exhibits physical symptoms such as low back pain or limb paralysis, without apparent physical cause. Recent neuroscientific research, however, is starting to show that there are characteristic patterns of brain activity associated with these states. All these disorders are thought to be unconscious, not feigned or intentional malingering.
Freudian psychoanalytic theory attributed hysterical symptoms to the subconscious mind's attempt to protect the patient from psychic stress. Subconscious motives include primary gain, in which the symptom directly relieves the stress (as when a patient coughs to release energy pent up from keeping a secret), and secondary gain, in which the symptom provides an independent advantage such as staying home from a hated job. More recent critics have noted the possibility of tertiary gain, when a patient is induced subconsciously to display a symptom because of the desires of others (as when a controlling husband enjoys the docility of his sick wife). There need be no gain at all, however, in a hysterical symptom. A child playing hockey may fall and for several hours believe he is unable to move, because he has recently heard of a famous hockey player who fell and broke his neck.
Jungian psychologist Laurie Layton Schapira explored what she labels a "Cassandra Complex" suffered by those traditionally diagnosed with hysteria, denoting a tendency for those with hysteria to be disbelieved or dismissed when relating the facticity of their experiences to others.[4] Based on clinical experience, she delineates three factors which constitute the Cassandra complex in hysterics: (a). dysfunctional relationships with social manifestations of rationality, order, and reason, leading to; (b). emotional or physical suffering, particularly in the form of somatic, often gynaecological complaints, and (c). being disbelieved or dismissed when attempting to relate the facticity of these experiences to others.[5]
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4. Jean-Martin Charcot
Jean-Martin Charcot
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Jean-Martin Charcot
Born November 29, 1825(1825-11-29)
Paris, France
Died August 16, 1893
Lac des Settons, Nièvre
Residence France
Nationality French
Fields Neurologist and professor of anatomical pathology
Institutions Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital
Jean-Martin Charcot (29 November 1825 – 16 August 1893) was a French neurologist and professor of anatomical pathology.[1] He is known as "the founder of modern neurology" and is "associated with at least 15 medical eponyms", including Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's disease).[1] His work greatly influenced the developing fields of neurology and psychology. He was the "foremost neurologist of late nineteenth-century France"[2] and has been called "the Napoleon of the neuroses".[3]
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Jean-Martin Charcot
(November 29, 1825-August 16, 1893)
French Neurologist
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Influences
Student of:
Influenced by:
Students: Freud, Binet
Influenced:
Time Period: Modern Foundations
Education
Paris Medical School (1843-1853)
Career
Appointed Chef de clinique, Paris Medical School (1853-1855)
Appointed Médecin du Bureau Central, Paris Medical School (1856-1860)
Becomes Associate Professor at the Paris Medical School (1960-1861)
Elected Vice President of Société de Biologie (1861)
Appointed Chef de service, Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris (1862-1872)
Professor and Chair of Pathological Anatomy, Salpêtrière Hospital (1872-1893)
Major Contributions
He was one of the most famous neurologists of all time
He was an influential teacher: Sigmund Freud and Alfred Binet studied under him at the Salpêtrière
He discovered and described a variety of neurologically-based diseases, including Charcot Joint, Charcot Foot, Charcot Disease (Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis) and Charcot-Marie-Tooth Disease
He was among the first to match specific anatomical lesions to a variety of neurological disorders, including epilepsy, multiple sclerosis and strokes (Goetz, et al., 1995, p. xix).
Ideas and Interests
21st century psychologists are primarily interested in Charcot's research into the causes of Hysteria. Although this disorder expressed itself differently in each patient, most suffered a combination of physical and psychological symptoms, which could include delirium, paralysis, rigidity and contraction of muscles, blindness, inability to speak, loss of feeling, vomiting, hemorrhaging, seizures, joint deformity and distended abdomens. Many contemporary physicians accused the hysterical patients of malingering and fraud, but Charcot was convinced that the patients believed that their symptoms were real, and that the physical symptoms were indicative of a genuine psychological problem (Fancher, 1985, p. 53).
To investigate his hypothesis, Charcot combined his traditionally meticulous diagnostic methods with novel experimental techniques involving hypnotism, magnetism and electricity. Although modern science acknowledges that both his methods and his conclusions were flawed, he is still recognized as a pioneer in the effort to link physiological and mental processes (Goetz et al., 1995, p. 197-198).
Charcot is also famous for his theatrical teaching style. He replaced traditional hospital rounds at the Salpêtrière with clinical demonstrations and patient interviews in the hospital amphitheater. These dramatic "hysteria shows" (Hunter, 1998) caught the attention of non-medical intellectuals, and aroused public curiosity to the extent that hysteria became almost vogue. Although Charcot was charged with voyeurism and exploitation, he is credited with adding the word "neurology" to the everyday vocabulary of the Parisian populace (Goetz et al., 1995, p. xix).
Charcot's contributions to the history of intelligence testing are fourfold. First, he established and popularized neurology as its own science. Second, his work with hypnotized hysterics blurred the line between physiological and psychological investigation, paving the way for intelligence researchers interested in neurophysiological and genetic correlates for intelligence. Third, he maintained a moderate (and sometimes unpopular) stance on the heredity-environment problem. He was one of the first advocates of the diasthesis-stress model; that is, he believed that hysteric patients inherited a genetic predisposition to the disease, but that the disease became manifest only after exposure to specific environmental stressors. This model is widely accepted today as an explanation for the interaction between genetics and the environment. Fourth, both Alfred Binet and Sigmund Freud spent time working with Charcot at the Salpêtrière.
For five months during 1885 and 1886, Freud attended Charcot's clinical hysteria demonstrations in the Salpêtrière amphitheater. At the time of his visit Freud was a neurologist, and many historians believe that his sojourn with Charcot is partially responsible for his future professional interest in unconscious processes. Indeed, some historians contend that Charcot's investigations into the causes of hysteria may have been a precursor to Freudian psychoanalysis (Goetz et al., 1995, pp. 210, 336).
Alfred Binet spent seven years working with Charcot's hypnotized hysterics, and there is little doubt that the experience changed the course of his career. Charcot had come to believe that susceptibility to hypnosis was an indicator of latent hysteria. He based this belief on the fact that hysterical symptoms could be reproduced by hypnotic suggestions (Fancher, 1985, p. 54). Binet saw Charcot's demonstrations, and wholeheartedly accepted his mentor's hypothesis. He quickly published four articles describing the success of Charcot's experiments. However, when evidence began to mount that Charcot's experimental design was seriously flawed, Binet was forced to admit publicly that he had been wrong (Wolf, 1972, p. 5). This embarrassment taught Binet to be a more careful researcher, so it is likely that the quality of his future intelligence work was positively affected by this experience. Additionally, Charcot's preference for detailed case-study analysis would come to be reflected in Binet's methodology (Fancher, 1985, p. 57).
Selected Publications
Charcot, J.M. (1875). Sur les localizations cérébrales. Comptes-Rendus des Seánces et Mémoires de la Société de Biologie, 24, 400-404.
Charcot, J.M. (1877). Lectures on the diseases of the nervous system, delivered at La Salpêtrière. London.
Charcot, J.M. (1882). Physiologie pathologique. Sur les divers états nerveux déterminés par l'hypnotisation chez les hystériques. [Pathological physiology: On the various nervous states determined by the hypnotisation of hystericals]. Comptes rendus de l'Académie Des Sciences, 94, 403-405.
Charcot, J.M. (1885). Oeuvres complètes. [Complete works]. Paris: Bureau du Progrès Mèdical.
References
Fancher, R.E. (1985). The intelligence men: Makers of the IQ controversy. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Goetz, C.G., Bonduelle, M., & Gelfand, T. (1995). Charcot: Constructing neurology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hunter, D. (Ed.). (1998). The makings of Dr. Charcot's hysteria shows. Lampeter, Cerdigion, Wales: The Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd.
Wolf, T.H. (1973). Alfred Binet. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Image courtesy of the National Library of Medicine
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Jean Charcot -- mentioned in three of the internet passages above -- very much influenced the beginning of Freud's psychological career, and demonstrated to Freud, as well as to many others, that hysterical symptoms could be either added or subtracted by his use of hypnosis, persuasion, and 'mind control' on whoever he was able to put into a hypnotic trance. The idea here was to demonstrate that hysterical symptoms were 'psychologically as opposed to physically caused'.
This subject matter -- hysteria, its validity and/or non-validity as a 'legitimately diagnosed disease', and its relation to the birth of Psychoanalysis -- is a very complicated, convoluted issue, with many people disagreeing on many different nuances of the issue.
Freud still has many supporters -- and non-supporters -- and DGB Philosophy-Psychology continues to work as an 'integrative-dialectical theory', weighing the pros and cons of both Freudian supporters and detractors while at the same time adding in its own continually evolving editorial opinions.
Since at least one source of Freud's interconnection of ideas sprang strongly from the ideas of Charcot and particularly, the 'psycho-genesis' of hysteria, often both Freud and Charcot are seen in the same light here, either strongly positively or strongly negatively without too many noticeable people taking a 'middle ground position' which is mainly where DGB Philosophy-Psychology operates out of.
Here are two editorial perspectives, the first coming from a Psychoanalytic organization and website that is 'pro-Charcot and pro-Freud', the second writer who I am just now becoming introduced to, coming out strongly in opposition to the legitimacy of both Charcot's and Freud's ideas and their resulting diagnoses of 'hysteria' back in the 1880s and 1890s...
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Some Aspects of Charcot's Influence on Freud
Julian A. Miller, M.D.
IN PREVIOUS PAPERS (15), (22), (23) members of the Workshop on Scientific Methodology have considered the origins and modifications of some early concepts in psychoanalysis. We had been interested in the influences impinging on Freud during the early days of discovery and concept formation. In this context, Freud's trip to Paris to study with Charcot seemed pivotal in his shift from neurological and physiological to psychopathological work. Although Jones (19) traces the principles upon which Freud constructed his theories back to the influence of Brücke, he also states: "It was assuredly the experience with Charcot in Paris that aroused Freud's interest in hysteria, then in psychopathology in general, and so paved the way for resuscitating Breuer's observation and developing psychoanalysis" (Vol. 1, p. 75).
We have examined Charcot's writings (3) as well as some of those who have commented upon his work (5), (16), (17), (18), (24) to understand Charcot's theoretical
[This is a summary or excerpt from the full text of the book or article. The full text of the document is available to subscribers.]
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From the internet...
Freud, Charcot and hysteria: lost in the labyrinth
RICHARD WEBSTER
The origins of psychoanalysis in the diagnostic darkness and medical errors of the late nineteenth century.
www.richardwebster.net/freudandcharcot.html - 48k - Cached - Similar pages
Charcot demonstrates a case of 'hysteria' c. 1885
The following essay consists of four sections from my volume in the Weidenfeld 'Great Philosophers' series: Freud (2003). For a more detailed discussion of the medical diagnosis of hysteria and further comment on Charcot, click here for an extract from Why Freud Was Wrong (1995).
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Hysteria, Anna O., and the Invention of Psychoanalysis
Sigmund Freud was born in 1856, in the small Austro-Hungarian town of Freiberg. Unusually he was born in a caul – a kind of membrane – and his mother immediately took this as a portent of his future fame. She called him ‘mein goldener Sigi’, and throughout his childhood and early adolescence in Vienna he was surrounded by his parents’ adulation and by their urgent expectation of his future greatness. As Freud embarked on a career in medicine, which eventually led him to study in the newly emerging field of neurology, these expectations seem to have become increasingly burdensome. For, although outwardly successful, he appears to have begun to despair of ever being granted the kind of world-redeeming revelation which he felt inwardly compelled to seek.
Freud’s earliest unsuccessful skirmish with fame took place in 1885 when, after experimenting with taking cocaine, he sought medical glory by publishing a paper on the drug as a miracle-therapy. In writing this paper, however, he failed to observe the crucial properties of the drug as a local anaesthetic while simultaneously omitting to warn against cocaine addiction. Freud, however, was not deterred by this unfortunate episode from seeking medical distinction. He almost immediately left Vienna for Paris where, from October 1885 to February 1886, he studied under the famous neurologist Charcot.
Charcot specialised in treating patients who were suffering from a variety of unexplained physical symptoms including paralysis, contractures (muscles which contract and cannot be relaxed) and seizures. Some of these patients sporadically and compulsively adopted a bizarre posture (christened arc-de-cercle) in which they arched their body backwards until they were supported only by their head and their heels. Charcot eventually came to the conclusion that many of his patients were suffering from a form of hysteria which had been induced by their emotional response to a traumatic accident in their past – such as a fall from a scaffold or a railway crash. They suffered, in his view, not from the physical effects of the accident, but from the idea they had formed of it.
Freud was immensely impressed by Charcot’s work on traumatic hysteria and took from it the notion that one of the principal forms of neurosis came about when a traumatic experience led to process of unconscious symptom-formation. He now began to develop this idea, and did so partly by reference to the work of a medical colleague, Josef Breuer. Freud was especially interested in the most unusual of all his colleague’s patients, the celebrated ‘Anna O.’ whom Breuer had begun to treat in 1880.
Anna O. was a twenty-one-year-old woman who had fallen ill while nursing her father who eventually died of a tubercular abscess. Her illness began with a severe cough. She subsequently developed a number of other physical symptoms, including paralysis of the extremities of the right side of her body, contractures, disturbances of vision, hearing and language. She also began to experience lapses of consciousness and hallucinations.
Breuer diagnosed Anna O.’s illness as a case of hysteria and gradually developed a form of therapy which he believed was effective in relieving her symptoms. He came to the conclusion that when he could induce her to relate to him during the evening the content of her daytime hallucinations, she became calm and tranquil. Breuer himself saw this as a way of ‘disposing’ of the ‘products’ of Anna O.’s ‘bad self’ and understood it as a process of emotional catharsis. The patient herself described it as ‘chimney sweeping’, and as her ‘talking cure’.
Breuer went on to extend this therapy. At one point in her illness, for a period of weeks, Anna O. declined to drink and would quench her thirst with fruit and melons. One evening, in a state of self-induced hypnosis, she described an occasion when she said she had been disgusted by the sight of a dog drinking out of a glass. Soon after this she asked for a drink and then woke from her hypnosis with a glass at her lips.
In his published account of the case, written some twelve years later, Breuer treated the story which Anna O. had related in a trance as a true account of an incident which had given rise to her aversion to drinking. He said he had concluded that the way to cure a particular symptom of ‘hysteria’ was to recreate the memory of the incident which had originally led to it and bring about emotional catharsis by inducing the patient to express any feeling associated with it..
The sudden disappearance of one of Anna O.’s many symptoms thus became the basis for what Breuer later described as a ‘therapeutic technical procedure’. According to both Freud and Breuer, this method had been applied systematically to each of Anna’s symptoms and as a result she was cured completely of her hysteria.
The case of Anna O. played a fundamental role in the development of Freud’s thought. She has frequently been described as the first psychoanalytic patient, a view which Freud himself, lecturing at Clark University in the United States, once endorsed:
If it is a merit to have brought psychoanalysis into being, that merit is not mine. I had no share in its earliest beginnings. I was a student and working for my final examinations at the time when another Viennese physician, Dr Josef Breuer first (in 1880-2) made use of this procedure on a girl who was suffering from hysteria. [1]
Freud, however, was understating his own role. Psychoanalysis would never have come into being if he had not transformed Breuer’s ‘talking cure’ by marrying it with Charcot’s views on traumatic hysteria and his own elaborate technique for reconstructing repressed memories through interpretation and free-association.
The patients whom Freud endeavoured to psychoanalyse at this early stage of his career, however, almost all resembled Anna O. in at least one respect; they came to Freud not because they were experiencing emotional distress but because they were suffering from physical symptoms. Freud’s first patient, for example, Frau Emmy von N., suffered speech difficulties, which Freud described as ‘spastic interruptions amounting to a stammer’. She was also plagued ‘by frequent convulsive tic-like movements of her face and the muscles of her neck’ and was compulsively given to making repetitive verbal exclamations and clicking sounds. Another patient, Lucy R., an English governess, suffered from strange olfactory hallucinations centring on the smell of burnt pudding. Yet another, Elisabeth von R., came to Freud because she had been suffering for more than two years from pains in her legs.
In all these cases Freud construed his patients’ illness as hysteria and set about uncovering the traumatic incident which had supposedly given rise to their symptoms. In order to help the process of analysis he developed what he called his ‘pressure technique’. This consisted in applying pressure to his patients’ forehead with his hands and instructing them to report faithfully ‘whatever appeared before their inner eye or passed through their memory at the moment of pressure’. Freud rapidly developed such faith in the effectiveness of this method for evoking pictures, ideas or unconscious ‘memories’ that he came to regard it as infallible, maintaining that if no images or memories were produced by the first application of pressure, repeated pressure would invariably be effective. When, in the course of treating Elisabeth von R. for her lameness, he suspected her of concealing thoughts from him, he decided to reinforce the physical pressure with mental pressure:
I no longer accepted her declaration that nothing had occurred to her, but assured her that something must have occurred to her. Perhaps, I said, she had not been sufficiently attentive, in which case I would be glad to repeat my pressure. Or perhaps she thought that her idea was not the right one. This, I told her, was not her affair; she was under an obligation to remain completely objective and say what had come into her head, whether it was appropriate or not. Finally I declared that I knew very well that something had occurred to her and that she was concealing it from me; but she would never be free of her pains so long as she concealed anything. By thus insisting I brought it about that from that time forward my pressure on her head never failed in its effect. [2]
At this period Freud believed that, in the final stages of therapy, it was helpful ‘if we can guess the ways in which things are connected up and tell the patient before we have uncovered it’. [3] When, however, he presented Elisabeth von R. with his conclusion, namely that her illness had been precipitated by her falling in love with her brother-in-law, she objected that that this was not true. Freud, however, persisted in his explanation and eventually reported that his patient had been cured.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (at this point six or seven sections of the original book are omitted) . . . . . . . . .
Freud and Charcot
The psychoanalytic movement is undoubtedly a powerful one which has endured one century and is likely to endure another. But from its very beginnings it has attracted criticism. This criticism has tended to become better informed with the passing of time. With almost a hundred of years of Freud scholarship to draw on, it is now possible, perhaps for the first time, to offer a considered and balanced judgement on the value both of Freud’s thought and of the movement he founded.
One of the obstacles which, perhaps more than any other, has stood in the way of a full understanding of Freud’s ideas, is that many of those who have written about psychoanalysis, in Europe, in Britain or in America, have been scholars involved in the humanities. Whether writing as champions or critics, they have tended to present psychoanalysis as a humanistic discipline. As a result we often forget that it was in its origins a medical movement.
Psychoanalysis was born not, as is frequently claimed, out of the foibles of emotionally unstable middle-class women who came to consult Freud in Vienna. It was born amidst the florid and sometimes extreme physical symptoms displayed by patients who had been consigned to one of France’s greatest hospitals – La Salpêtrière in Paris. The original begetter of the theory of unconscious symptom-formation – a theory which lies at the heart of psychoanalysis – was not Freud, nor even Breuer, but Jean Martin Charcot.
Charcot was not a psychologist, he was a neurologist. His greatest gift was a genius for anatomical dissection and post-mortem diagnosis. His greatest handicap was that he practised neurology at a time when techniques of tissue-staining were primitive, X rays had not been discovered and the instruments of investigation which have made modern neuroscience possible did not exist. The electroencephalogram (EEG), which would revolutionise neurology and psychiatry, was not in general use until the 1940s. Other techniques for brain-imaging, such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), were not introduced until the closing decades of the twentieth century. Even today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the process of charting the brain’s intricate functioning has barely begun. As Rita Carter writes in her book Mapping the Mind, ‘the vision of the brain we have now is probably no more complete or accurate than a sixteenth-century map of the world.’ [4]
In 1886, at the time of Freud’s crucial encounter with Charcot, the map was scarcely drawn at all. Neurologists inhabited a world of almost complete diagnostic darkness, illuminated only by the occasional gleam of medical insight. Perhaps more importantly still, leading neurologists remained blissfully unaware of the depth of their ignorance. Charcot himself believed that the work of neurology was almost complete.
What this meant in practice was that many subtle neurological disorders, such as temporal lobe epilepsy, and frontal-lobe epilepsy, were unrecognised in Charcot’s day. At the same time, the internal pathology of head injuries remained an almost complete mystery. Closed head injuries, which produce concussion without leaving any external injury, were simply not recognised. This was the diagnostic darkness within which the fundamental principles of psychoanalysis were formulated. The medical and intellectual consequences are perhaps best illustrated by Charcot’s classic case of traumatic hysteria – a case involving a patient known as ‘Le Log–––’.
Le Log––– was a florist’s delivery man in Paris. One evening, in October 1885, he was wheeling his barrow home through busy streets when it was hit from the side by a carriage which was being driven at great speed. Le Log–––, who had been holding the handles of his barrow tightly, was spun through the air and landed on the ground. He was picked up completely unconscious. He was then taken to the nearby Beaujon hospital where he remained unconscious for five or six days. Six months later he was transferred to La Salpêtrière. By this time the lower extremities of his body were almost completely paralysed, there was a twitching or tremor in the corner of his mouth, he had a permanent headache and there were ‘blank spaces in the tablet of his memory’. In particular he could not remember the accident itself. But, because there had never been any signs of external injury, Charcot decided that Le Log––– was a victim of traumatic hysteria and that his symptoms had arisen as a result of the psychological trauma he had suffered. Charcot came to this conclusion knowing full well that some weeks after his accident Le Log––– had suffered heavy nose-bleeds and a series of violent seizures – seizures which Charcot deemed hysterical.
In the century which has passed since Charcot made this diagnosis, the face of neurology – and of general medicine – has been transformed. If Le Log––– were to be brought today to a hospital in practically any part of the Western world there can be no doubt that doctors would recognise a case of closed head injury complicated by late epilepsy and raised intracranial pressure.
From this we may derive a conclusion which is both simple and terrible in its implications: Le Log–––, the classic example of a patient who supposedly suffered from traumatic hysteria, did not forget because he was frightened. He forgot because he was concussed. His various symptoms were not produced by an unconscious idea. They were the result of brain damage.
We are here confronted by what may well be the most momentous medical misunderstanding which has taken place in the last two centuries. For Charcot’s failure to recognise cases of closed head injury, and the symptoms they gave rise to, would shape the development of psychoanalysis. It was the main factor which would eventually lead Freud to elaborate his entire theory of unconscious symptom-formation – or ‘repression’.
(If you are interested in reading the rest of this rather provocative Webster article, please visit Richard Webster's rather provocative website. I am still trying to get a full handle on his ideas and what they do and don't mean relative to my own beliefs about Psychoanalysis and the good and bad legacy of Freud relative to the evolution of Clinical Psychology, Psychotherapy, and his influence on the still evolving ideas of DGB Philosophy and Psychology which remain extremely significant.)
I will start to explore some of these good and bad ideas, as well as offering a counter-thesis to Webster's thesis here above in Part 2 which will appear above.
-- dgbn, Dec. 14th, 2008, finished Dec. 17th, 2008.
-- David Gordon Bain,
-- Democracy Goes Beyond Narcissism,
-- Dialectical Gap-Briding Negotiations...
Are still in process....
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In Freudian Psychology -- i.e., Psychoanalysis -- Freud started out by treating 'hysterical' women -- meaning women who complained of, and/or demonstrated characteristics or 'symptoms' of physical disease, without any doctors being able to find the underylying 'physical causes' or 'roots' of these characteristics/symptoms. Such cases -- rightly or wrongly -- were lumped into the category of 'hysteria' meaning essentially 'case demonstrations of physical disease without the diagnosed underlying physical causes that would normally lead the doctor in the direction of the "cure"'. From the beginning of time practically such diseases have been classified as 'a woman's disease' -- 'hysteria' as it was originally defined (by Hippocrates) meant 'wandering uterus', meaning that it was associated with being a woman, or worse, 'a crazy woman' or 'demonized woman', and throughout the course of history there have been an equally 'crazy and/or not so crazy assortment of "doctor cures" aimed at correcting this diagnosed and/or misdiagnosed 'female problem'...
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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article is about the state of mind. For other uses, see Hysteria (disambiguation).
Hysteria, in its colloquial use, describes a state of mind, one of unmanageable fear or emotional excesses. The fear is often caused by multiple events in one's past that involved some sort of severe conflict; the fear can be centered on a body part or most commonly on an imagined problem with that body part (disease is a common complaint. See also Body dysmorphic disorder and Hypochondriasis. People who are "hysterical" often lose self-control due to the overwhelming fear.
Psychiatrists and other physicians have in theory given up the use of "hysteria", replacing it with more euphemistic terms that are essentially synonyms. These include "psychosomatic", "functional", "nonorganic", "psychogenic", and "medically unexplained". In 1980 the American Psychiatric Association officially changed the diagnosis of "hysterical neurosis, conversion type" to "conversion disorder". Hysteria also has significant overlap with the diagnostic term "somatization disorder" and with somatoform disorders in general.
History
Main article: Female hysteria
The term originates with the Greek medical term, hysterikos. This referred to a medical condition, thought to be particular to women, caused by disturbances of the uterus, hystera in Greek. The term hysteria was coined by Hippocrates, who thought that suffocation and madness arose in women whose uteri had become too light and dry from lack of sexual intercourse and, as a result, wandered upward, compressing the heart, lungs, and diaphragm.
The same general definition, or under the name female hysteria, came into widespread use in the middle and late 19th century to describe what is today generally considered to be sexual dissatisfaction.[1] Typical treatment was massage of the patient's genitalia by the physician and later vibrators or water sprays to cause orgasm.[1] By the early 1900s, the practice and usage of the term had fallen from use until it was again popularized when the writings of Sigmund Freud became known and influential in Britain and the USA in the 1920s. The Freudian psychoanalytic school of psychology uses its own, somewhat controversial, ways to treat hysteria.
The knowledge of hysterical processes was advanced by the work of Jean-Martin Charcot, a French neurologist. However, many now consider hysteria to be a legacy diagnosis (i.e., a catch-all junk diagnosis),[2] particularly due to its long list of possible manifestations: one Victorian physician cataloged 75 pages of possible symptoms of hysteria and called the list incomplete.[3].
Current psychiatric terminology distinguishes two types of hysteria: somatoform and dissociative. Dissociative hysteria includes amnestic fugue states. Somatoform disorders include conversion disorder, somatization disorder, chronic pain disorder, hypochondriasis, and body dysmorphic disorder. In somatoform disorders, the patient exhibits physical symptoms such as low back pain or limb paralysis, without apparent physical cause. Recent neuroscientific research, however, is starting to show that there are characteristic patterns of brain activity associated with these states. All these disorders are thought to be unconscious, not feigned or intentional malingering.
Freudian psychoanalytic theory attributed hysterical symptoms to the subconscious mind's attempt to protect the patient from psychic stress. Subconscious motives include primary gain, in which the symptom directly relieves the stress (as when a patient coughs to release energy pent up from keeping a secret), and secondary gain, in which the symptom provides an independent advantage such as staying home from a hated job. More recent critics have noted the possibility of tertiary gain, when a patient is induced subconsciously to display a symptom because of the desires of others (as when a controlling husband enjoys the docility of his sick wife). There need be no gain at all, however, in a hysterical symptom. A child playing hockey may fall and for several hours believe he is unable to move, because he has recently heard of a famous hockey player who fell and broke his neck.
Jungian psychologist Laurie Layton Schapira explored what she labels a "Cassandra Complex" suffered by those traditionally diagnosed with hysteria, denoting a tendency for those with hysteria to be disbelieved or dismissed when relating the facticity of their experiences to others.[4] Based on clinical experience, she delineates three factors which constitute the Cassandra complex in hysterics: (a). dysfunctional relationships with social manifestations of rationality, order, and reason, leading to; (b). emotional or physical suffering, particularly in the form of somatic, often gynaecological complaints, and (c). being disbelieved or dismissed when attempting to relate the facticity of these experiences to others.[5]
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4. Jean-Martin Charcot
Jean-Martin Charcot
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Jean-Martin Charcot
Born November 29, 1825(1825-11-29)
Paris, France
Died August 16, 1893
Lac des Settons, Nièvre
Residence France
Nationality French
Fields Neurologist and professor of anatomical pathology
Institutions Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital
Jean-Martin Charcot (29 November 1825 – 16 August 1893) was a French neurologist and professor of anatomical pathology.[1] He is known as "the founder of modern neurology" and is "associated with at least 15 medical eponyms", including Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's disease).[1] His work greatly influenced the developing fields of neurology and psychology. He was the "foremost neurologist of late nineteenth-century France"[2] and has been called "the Napoleon of the neuroses".[3]
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Jean-Martin Charcot
(November 29, 1825-August 16, 1893)
French Neurologist
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Influences
Student of:
Influenced by:
Students: Freud, Binet
Influenced:
Time Period: Modern Foundations
Education
Paris Medical School (1843-1853)
Career
Appointed Chef de clinique, Paris Medical School (1853-1855)
Appointed Médecin du Bureau Central, Paris Medical School (1856-1860)
Becomes Associate Professor at the Paris Medical School (1960-1861)
Elected Vice President of Société de Biologie (1861)
Appointed Chef de service, Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris (1862-1872)
Professor and Chair of Pathological Anatomy, Salpêtrière Hospital (1872-1893)
Major Contributions
He was one of the most famous neurologists of all time
He was an influential teacher: Sigmund Freud and Alfred Binet studied under him at the Salpêtrière
He discovered and described a variety of neurologically-based diseases, including Charcot Joint, Charcot Foot, Charcot Disease (Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis) and Charcot-Marie-Tooth Disease
He was among the first to match specific anatomical lesions to a variety of neurological disorders, including epilepsy, multiple sclerosis and strokes (Goetz, et al., 1995, p. xix).
Ideas and Interests
21st century psychologists are primarily interested in Charcot's research into the causes of Hysteria. Although this disorder expressed itself differently in each patient, most suffered a combination of physical and psychological symptoms, which could include delirium, paralysis, rigidity and contraction of muscles, blindness, inability to speak, loss of feeling, vomiting, hemorrhaging, seizures, joint deformity and distended abdomens. Many contemporary physicians accused the hysterical patients of malingering and fraud, but Charcot was convinced that the patients believed that their symptoms were real, and that the physical symptoms were indicative of a genuine psychological problem (Fancher, 1985, p. 53).
To investigate his hypothesis, Charcot combined his traditionally meticulous diagnostic methods with novel experimental techniques involving hypnotism, magnetism and electricity. Although modern science acknowledges that both his methods and his conclusions were flawed, he is still recognized as a pioneer in the effort to link physiological and mental processes (Goetz et al., 1995, p. 197-198).
Charcot is also famous for his theatrical teaching style. He replaced traditional hospital rounds at the Salpêtrière with clinical demonstrations and patient interviews in the hospital amphitheater. These dramatic "hysteria shows" (Hunter, 1998) caught the attention of non-medical intellectuals, and aroused public curiosity to the extent that hysteria became almost vogue. Although Charcot was charged with voyeurism and exploitation, he is credited with adding the word "neurology" to the everyday vocabulary of the Parisian populace (Goetz et al., 1995, p. xix).
Charcot's contributions to the history of intelligence testing are fourfold. First, he established and popularized neurology as its own science. Second, his work with hypnotized hysterics blurred the line between physiological and psychological investigation, paving the way for intelligence researchers interested in neurophysiological and genetic correlates for intelligence. Third, he maintained a moderate (and sometimes unpopular) stance on the heredity-environment problem. He was one of the first advocates of the diasthesis-stress model; that is, he believed that hysteric patients inherited a genetic predisposition to the disease, but that the disease became manifest only after exposure to specific environmental stressors. This model is widely accepted today as an explanation for the interaction between genetics and the environment. Fourth, both Alfred Binet and Sigmund Freud spent time working with Charcot at the Salpêtrière.
For five months during 1885 and 1886, Freud attended Charcot's clinical hysteria demonstrations in the Salpêtrière amphitheater. At the time of his visit Freud was a neurologist, and many historians believe that his sojourn with Charcot is partially responsible for his future professional interest in unconscious processes. Indeed, some historians contend that Charcot's investigations into the causes of hysteria may have been a precursor to Freudian psychoanalysis (Goetz et al., 1995, pp. 210, 336).
Alfred Binet spent seven years working with Charcot's hypnotized hysterics, and there is little doubt that the experience changed the course of his career. Charcot had come to believe that susceptibility to hypnosis was an indicator of latent hysteria. He based this belief on the fact that hysterical symptoms could be reproduced by hypnotic suggestions (Fancher, 1985, p. 54). Binet saw Charcot's demonstrations, and wholeheartedly accepted his mentor's hypothesis. He quickly published four articles describing the success of Charcot's experiments. However, when evidence began to mount that Charcot's experimental design was seriously flawed, Binet was forced to admit publicly that he had been wrong (Wolf, 1972, p. 5). This embarrassment taught Binet to be a more careful researcher, so it is likely that the quality of his future intelligence work was positively affected by this experience. Additionally, Charcot's preference for detailed case-study analysis would come to be reflected in Binet's methodology (Fancher, 1985, p. 57).
Selected Publications
Charcot, J.M. (1875). Sur les localizations cérébrales. Comptes-Rendus des Seánces et Mémoires de la Société de Biologie, 24, 400-404.
Charcot, J.M. (1877). Lectures on the diseases of the nervous system, delivered at La Salpêtrière. London.
Charcot, J.M. (1882). Physiologie pathologique. Sur les divers états nerveux déterminés par l'hypnotisation chez les hystériques. [Pathological physiology: On the various nervous states determined by the hypnotisation of hystericals]. Comptes rendus de l'Académie Des Sciences, 94, 403-405.
Charcot, J.M. (1885). Oeuvres complètes. [Complete works]. Paris: Bureau du Progrès Mèdical.
References
Fancher, R.E. (1985). The intelligence men: Makers of the IQ controversy. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Goetz, C.G., Bonduelle, M., & Gelfand, T. (1995). Charcot: Constructing neurology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hunter, D. (Ed.). (1998). The makings of Dr. Charcot's hysteria shows. Lampeter, Cerdigion, Wales: The Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd.
Wolf, T.H. (1973). Alfred Binet. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Image courtesy of the National Library of Medicine
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Jean Charcot -- mentioned in three of the internet passages above -- very much influenced the beginning of Freud's psychological career, and demonstrated to Freud, as well as to many others, that hysterical symptoms could be either added or subtracted by his use of hypnosis, persuasion, and 'mind control' on whoever he was able to put into a hypnotic trance. The idea here was to demonstrate that hysterical symptoms were 'psychologically as opposed to physically caused'.
This subject matter -- hysteria, its validity and/or non-validity as a 'legitimately diagnosed disease', and its relation to the birth of Psychoanalysis -- is a very complicated, convoluted issue, with many people disagreeing on many different nuances of the issue.
Freud still has many supporters -- and non-supporters -- and DGB Philosophy-Psychology continues to work as an 'integrative-dialectical theory', weighing the pros and cons of both Freudian supporters and detractors while at the same time adding in its own continually evolving editorial opinions.
Since at least one source of Freud's interconnection of ideas sprang strongly from the ideas of Charcot and particularly, the 'psycho-genesis' of hysteria, often both Freud and Charcot are seen in the same light here, either strongly positively or strongly negatively without too many noticeable people taking a 'middle ground position' which is mainly where DGB Philosophy-Psychology operates out of.
Here are two editorial perspectives, the first coming from a Psychoanalytic organization and website that is 'pro-Charcot and pro-Freud', the second writer who I am just now becoming introduced to, coming out strongly in opposition to the legitimacy of both Charcot's and Freud's ideas and their resulting diagnoses of 'hysteria' back in the 1880s and 1890s...
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Some Aspects of Charcot's Influence on Freud
Julian A. Miller, M.D.
IN PREVIOUS PAPERS (15), (22), (23) members of the Workshop on Scientific Methodology have considered the origins and modifications of some early concepts in psychoanalysis. We had been interested in the influences impinging on Freud during the early days of discovery and concept formation. In this context, Freud's trip to Paris to study with Charcot seemed pivotal in his shift from neurological and physiological to psychopathological work. Although Jones (19) traces the principles upon which Freud constructed his theories back to the influence of Brücke, he also states: "It was assuredly the experience with Charcot in Paris that aroused Freud's interest in hysteria, then in psychopathology in general, and so paved the way for resuscitating Breuer's observation and developing psychoanalysis" (Vol. 1, p. 75).
We have examined Charcot's writings (3) as well as some of those who have commented upon his work (5), (16), (17), (18), (24) to understand Charcot's theoretical
[This is a summary or excerpt from the full text of the book or article. The full text of the document is available to subscribers.]
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From the internet...
Freud, Charcot and hysteria: lost in the labyrinth
RICHARD WEBSTER
The origins of psychoanalysis in the diagnostic darkness and medical errors of the late nineteenth century.
www.richardwebster.net/freudandcharcot.html - 48k - Cached - Similar pages
Charcot demonstrates a case of 'hysteria' c. 1885
The following essay consists of four sections from my volume in the Weidenfeld 'Great Philosophers' series: Freud (2003). For a more detailed discussion of the medical diagnosis of hysteria and further comment on Charcot, click here for an extract from Why Freud Was Wrong (1995).
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Hysteria, Anna O., and the Invention of Psychoanalysis
Sigmund Freud was born in 1856, in the small Austro-Hungarian town of Freiberg. Unusually he was born in a caul – a kind of membrane – and his mother immediately took this as a portent of his future fame. She called him ‘mein goldener Sigi’, and throughout his childhood and early adolescence in Vienna he was surrounded by his parents’ adulation and by their urgent expectation of his future greatness. As Freud embarked on a career in medicine, which eventually led him to study in the newly emerging field of neurology, these expectations seem to have become increasingly burdensome. For, although outwardly successful, he appears to have begun to despair of ever being granted the kind of world-redeeming revelation which he felt inwardly compelled to seek.
Freud’s earliest unsuccessful skirmish with fame took place in 1885 when, after experimenting with taking cocaine, he sought medical glory by publishing a paper on the drug as a miracle-therapy. In writing this paper, however, he failed to observe the crucial properties of the drug as a local anaesthetic while simultaneously omitting to warn against cocaine addiction. Freud, however, was not deterred by this unfortunate episode from seeking medical distinction. He almost immediately left Vienna for Paris where, from October 1885 to February 1886, he studied under the famous neurologist Charcot.
Charcot specialised in treating patients who were suffering from a variety of unexplained physical symptoms including paralysis, contractures (muscles which contract and cannot be relaxed) and seizures. Some of these patients sporadically and compulsively adopted a bizarre posture (christened arc-de-cercle) in which they arched their body backwards until they were supported only by their head and their heels. Charcot eventually came to the conclusion that many of his patients were suffering from a form of hysteria which had been induced by their emotional response to a traumatic accident in their past – such as a fall from a scaffold or a railway crash. They suffered, in his view, not from the physical effects of the accident, but from the idea they had formed of it.
Freud was immensely impressed by Charcot’s work on traumatic hysteria and took from it the notion that one of the principal forms of neurosis came about when a traumatic experience led to process of unconscious symptom-formation. He now began to develop this idea, and did so partly by reference to the work of a medical colleague, Josef Breuer. Freud was especially interested in the most unusual of all his colleague’s patients, the celebrated ‘Anna O.’ whom Breuer had begun to treat in 1880.
Anna O. was a twenty-one-year-old woman who had fallen ill while nursing her father who eventually died of a tubercular abscess. Her illness began with a severe cough. She subsequently developed a number of other physical symptoms, including paralysis of the extremities of the right side of her body, contractures, disturbances of vision, hearing and language. She also began to experience lapses of consciousness and hallucinations.
Breuer diagnosed Anna O.’s illness as a case of hysteria and gradually developed a form of therapy which he believed was effective in relieving her symptoms. He came to the conclusion that when he could induce her to relate to him during the evening the content of her daytime hallucinations, she became calm and tranquil. Breuer himself saw this as a way of ‘disposing’ of the ‘products’ of Anna O.’s ‘bad self’ and understood it as a process of emotional catharsis. The patient herself described it as ‘chimney sweeping’, and as her ‘talking cure’.
Breuer went on to extend this therapy. At one point in her illness, for a period of weeks, Anna O. declined to drink and would quench her thirst with fruit and melons. One evening, in a state of self-induced hypnosis, she described an occasion when she said she had been disgusted by the sight of a dog drinking out of a glass. Soon after this she asked for a drink and then woke from her hypnosis with a glass at her lips.
In his published account of the case, written some twelve years later, Breuer treated the story which Anna O. had related in a trance as a true account of an incident which had given rise to her aversion to drinking. He said he had concluded that the way to cure a particular symptom of ‘hysteria’ was to recreate the memory of the incident which had originally led to it and bring about emotional catharsis by inducing the patient to express any feeling associated with it..
The sudden disappearance of one of Anna O.’s many symptoms thus became the basis for what Breuer later described as a ‘therapeutic technical procedure’. According to both Freud and Breuer, this method had been applied systematically to each of Anna’s symptoms and as a result she was cured completely of her hysteria.
The case of Anna O. played a fundamental role in the development of Freud’s thought. She has frequently been described as the first psychoanalytic patient, a view which Freud himself, lecturing at Clark University in the United States, once endorsed:
If it is a merit to have brought psychoanalysis into being, that merit is not mine. I had no share in its earliest beginnings. I was a student and working for my final examinations at the time when another Viennese physician, Dr Josef Breuer first (in 1880-2) made use of this procedure on a girl who was suffering from hysteria. [1]
Freud, however, was understating his own role. Psychoanalysis would never have come into being if he had not transformed Breuer’s ‘talking cure’ by marrying it with Charcot’s views on traumatic hysteria and his own elaborate technique for reconstructing repressed memories through interpretation and free-association.
The patients whom Freud endeavoured to psychoanalyse at this early stage of his career, however, almost all resembled Anna O. in at least one respect; they came to Freud not because they were experiencing emotional distress but because they were suffering from physical symptoms. Freud’s first patient, for example, Frau Emmy von N., suffered speech difficulties, which Freud described as ‘spastic interruptions amounting to a stammer’. She was also plagued ‘by frequent convulsive tic-like movements of her face and the muscles of her neck’ and was compulsively given to making repetitive verbal exclamations and clicking sounds. Another patient, Lucy R., an English governess, suffered from strange olfactory hallucinations centring on the smell of burnt pudding. Yet another, Elisabeth von R., came to Freud because she had been suffering for more than two years from pains in her legs.
In all these cases Freud construed his patients’ illness as hysteria and set about uncovering the traumatic incident which had supposedly given rise to their symptoms. In order to help the process of analysis he developed what he called his ‘pressure technique’. This consisted in applying pressure to his patients’ forehead with his hands and instructing them to report faithfully ‘whatever appeared before their inner eye or passed through their memory at the moment of pressure’. Freud rapidly developed such faith in the effectiveness of this method for evoking pictures, ideas or unconscious ‘memories’ that he came to regard it as infallible, maintaining that if no images or memories were produced by the first application of pressure, repeated pressure would invariably be effective. When, in the course of treating Elisabeth von R. for her lameness, he suspected her of concealing thoughts from him, he decided to reinforce the physical pressure with mental pressure:
I no longer accepted her declaration that nothing had occurred to her, but assured her that something must have occurred to her. Perhaps, I said, she had not been sufficiently attentive, in which case I would be glad to repeat my pressure. Or perhaps she thought that her idea was not the right one. This, I told her, was not her affair; she was under an obligation to remain completely objective and say what had come into her head, whether it was appropriate or not. Finally I declared that I knew very well that something had occurred to her and that she was concealing it from me; but she would never be free of her pains so long as she concealed anything. By thus insisting I brought it about that from that time forward my pressure on her head never failed in its effect. [2]
At this period Freud believed that, in the final stages of therapy, it was helpful ‘if we can guess the ways in which things are connected up and tell the patient before we have uncovered it’. [3] When, however, he presented Elisabeth von R. with his conclusion, namely that her illness had been precipitated by her falling in love with her brother-in-law, she objected that that this was not true. Freud, however, persisted in his explanation and eventually reported that his patient had been cured.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (at this point six or seven sections of the original book are omitted) . . . . . . . . .
Freud and Charcot
The psychoanalytic movement is undoubtedly a powerful one which has endured one century and is likely to endure another. But from its very beginnings it has attracted criticism. This criticism has tended to become better informed with the passing of time. With almost a hundred of years of Freud scholarship to draw on, it is now possible, perhaps for the first time, to offer a considered and balanced judgement on the value both of Freud’s thought and of the movement he founded.
One of the obstacles which, perhaps more than any other, has stood in the way of a full understanding of Freud’s ideas, is that many of those who have written about psychoanalysis, in Europe, in Britain or in America, have been scholars involved in the humanities. Whether writing as champions or critics, they have tended to present psychoanalysis as a humanistic discipline. As a result we often forget that it was in its origins a medical movement.
Psychoanalysis was born not, as is frequently claimed, out of the foibles of emotionally unstable middle-class women who came to consult Freud in Vienna. It was born amidst the florid and sometimes extreme physical symptoms displayed by patients who had been consigned to one of France’s greatest hospitals – La Salpêtrière in Paris. The original begetter of the theory of unconscious symptom-formation – a theory which lies at the heart of psychoanalysis – was not Freud, nor even Breuer, but Jean Martin Charcot.
Charcot was not a psychologist, he was a neurologist. His greatest gift was a genius for anatomical dissection and post-mortem diagnosis. His greatest handicap was that he practised neurology at a time when techniques of tissue-staining were primitive, X rays had not been discovered and the instruments of investigation which have made modern neuroscience possible did not exist. The electroencephalogram (EEG), which would revolutionise neurology and psychiatry, was not in general use until the 1940s. Other techniques for brain-imaging, such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), were not introduced until the closing decades of the twentieth century. Even today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the process of charting the brain’s intricate functioning has barely begun. As Rita Carter writes in her book Mapping the Mind, ‘the vision of the brain we have now is probably no more complete or accurate than a sixteenth-century map of the world.’ [4]
In 1886, at the time of Freud’s crucial encounter with Charcot, the map was scarcely drawn at all. Neurologists inhabited a world of almost complete diagnostic darkness, illuminated only by the occasional gleam of medical insight. Perhaps more importantly still, leading neurologists remained blissfully unaware of the depth of their ignorance. Charcot himself believed that the work of neurology was almost complete.
What this meant in practice was that many subtle neurological disorders, such as temporal lobe epilepsy, and frontal-lobe epilepsy, were unrecognised in Charcot’s day. At the same time, the internal pathology of head injuries remained an almost complete mystery. Closed head injuries, which produce concussion without leaving any external injury, were simply not recognised. This was the diagnostic darkness within which the fundamental principles of psychoanalysis were formulated. The medical and intellectual consequences are perhaps best illustrated by Charcot’s classic case of traumatic hysteria – a case involving a patient known as ‘Le Log–––’.
Le Log––– was a florist’s delivery man in Paris. One evening, in October 1885, he was wheeling his barrow home through busy streets when it was hit from the side by a carriage which was being driven at great speed. Le Log–––, who had been holding the handles of his barrow tightly, was spun through the air and landed on the ground. He was picked up completely unconscious. He was then taken to the nearby Beaujon hospital where he remained unconscious for five or six days. Six months later he was transferred to La Salpêtrière. By this time the lower extremities of his body were almost completely paralysed, there was a twitching or tremor in the corner of his mouth, he had a permanent headache and there were ‘blank spaces in the tablet of his memory’. In particular he could not remember the accident itself. But, because there had never been any signs of external injury, Charcot decided that Le Log––– was a victim of traumatic hysteria and that his symptoms had arisen as a result of the psychological trauma he had suffered. Charcot came to this conclusion knowing full well that some weeks after his accident Le Log––– had suffered heavy nose-bleeds and a series of violent seizures – seizures which Charcot deemed hysterical.
In the century which has passed since Charcot made this diagnosis, the face of neurology – and of general medicine – has been transformed. If Le Log––– were to be brought today to a hospital in practically any part of the Western world there can be no doubt that doctors would recognise a case of closed head injury complicated by late epilepsy and raised intracranial pressure.
From this we may derive a conclusion which is both simple and terrible in its implications: Le Log–––, the classic example of a patient who supposedly suffered from traumatic hysteria, did not forget because he was frightened. He forgot because he was concussed. His various symptoms were not produced by an unconscious idea. They were the result of brain damage.
We are here confronted by what may well be the most momentous medical misunderstanding which has taken place in the last two centuries. For Charcot’s failure to recognise cases of closed head injury, and the symptoms they gave rise to, would shape the development of psychoanalysis. It was the main factor which would eventually lead Freud to elaborate his entire theory of unconscious symptom-formation – or ‘repression’.
(If you are interested in reading the rest of this rather provocative Webster article, please visit Richard Webster's rather provocative website. I am still trying to get a full handle on his ideas and what they do and don't mean relative to my own beliefs about Psychoanalysis and the good and bad legacy of Freud relative to the evolution of Clinical Psychology, Psychotherapy, and his influence on the still evolving ideas of DGB Philosophy and Psychology which remain extremely significant.)
I will start to explore some of these good and bad ideas, as well as offering a counter-thesis to Webster's thesis here above in Part 2 which will appear above.
-- dgbn, Dec. 14th, 2008, finished Dec. 17th, 2008.
-- David Gordon Bain,
-- Democracy Goes Beyond Narcissism,
-- Dialectical Gap-Briding Negotiations...
Are still in process....
...................................................................................
...............................................................
Sunday, November 30, 2008
DGB Reflections On the 100th Anniversary of Freud and Jung Meeting For The First Time on March 3rd, 1907
Sunday, March 3rd, 1907, Freud and Jung Meeting For The First Time -- And Talking For 13 Hours Straight!
Freud and Jung -- theirs was an all too short and tumultous seven year relationship (1907-1914), passionate and explosive, reverent from each side at the beginning, much more rebellious from Jung's side as things progressed, often compared to a common father/son type relationship with Freud maintaining his authoritative paternal boundaries and Jung challenging these same boundaries -- eventually to the point of separation, and the building of two separate schools of psychology with partly siimilar, partly different philosophies and conceptualizations concerning human psychology. They both shared a partly Hegelian, partly Nietzschean philosophy. Freud was more a product of the Enlightenment, Jung a product of Romantic Philosophy. Jung seemed a little more willing to integrate the 'darker side' of human nature in a productive manner with the rest of man's personality, whereas Freud seemed more about 'rationally analyzing' this same dark side with the goal 'of bringing it under more rational, conscious, enlightened control -- but control none the less. Jung was willing to give up more of this control with a trust things would eventually integrate in a more healthy direction. This was one of the main dialectical splits or differences in opinion between Enlightenment and Romantic Philosophy -- just how much reason was man willing to give up and trust that man would still land back on firm ground again -- after some kind of a 'romantic flight' to who knows where.
Jung was more the mythologist, mystic, astrology, occult and para-normal psychologist. Freud didn't seem too comfortable following Jung into these areas. It just happens to be my birthday today -- Jung might be more apt to make a psychological interpretation in this regard, as I try to mediate between Freud and Jung, although I am just speculating here. Besides, if he wouldn't I will.
March 3rd. My birthday. I am a pisces -- often equated with 'two fish swimming towards each other and away from each other at the same time'(or not knowing which way to swim while wanting to swim both ways at the same time). Towards intimacy and committment. And/or away from intimacy and committment and towards more 'individual freedom and self-expression'.
How appropriate that Freud and Jung should meet together for the first time on this 'dualistic and 'dialectic' day. Two very strong-willed and creative men each doing their absolutely very best to 'will to power' their own separate vision and creation while admiring, respecting and learning from each other at the same time. Or at least in the beginning. Until their respective creative visions came into conflict with each other -- and this conflict became stronger and stronger, reaching more and more of an impasse that just would not go away. And then the anger and resentment started to seriously set in and put a fast ending to what had started out as such a strong and passionate relationship with Freud wanting to pass the 'metaphorical Psychoanalytic torch to Jung as his heir-in-waiting. But it was not to be. Psychoanalysis -- at least as Freud defined and described it -- was just too tight a 'theoretical box' for Jung to accept and live with. Jung needed a significantly different theoretical box that he could create himself, accept because it was his -- and thrive in.
And her is me -- a creative post-Hegelian, post-Nietzschean philosophical and psychological Pisces, trying my hardest to create the ultimate multi-dualistic and dialectical philosophy-psychology of all time. Including Freud and Jung who I have both borrowed from their respective 'theoretical boxes' (including Freud's four theoretical boxes: 'unconscious memory-traumacy theory', 'unconscious memory-seduction theory', 'Oedipal theory-childhood sexuality theory', and 'life and death instinct theory'. Perhaps you could even include the beginning of 'Object Relations' as Freud's fifth theory or conversely call this Melanie Klein's theory since she was the one who really grabbed a hold of this last theory and ran with it.)
DGBN Philosophy-Pscyhology -- the multi-dialectic bridge between any and all human differences, splits, conflicts, and paradoxes. Ideally, anyway, if not in reality. Some people just do not want to compromise and/or integrate their differences. They want the whole cake and eat it too. For these people, there are no compromises, no negotiations, no integrations. Just a very strong 'will to power' -- and how far that gets them either rhetorically and/or by exploitation, manipulation, bribery, blackmail, seduction, force and/or violence.
DGBN Philosophy-Psychology -- most importantly for our purposes here -- a philosphical and psychological dialectical bridge between the abyss of Freud and Jung.
But first, let us talk about a dialectical bridge beween Freud before and after his short little essay, 'Screen Memories' (1899), the major turning point between his 'pre-psychoanalytic traumatic and seduction theories' and his soon-to-be 'Psychoanalysis-proper' as trumpeted by the publication of his famous book, 'The Interpretation of Dreams' (1900).
Much has been made of this controversial theoretical and clinical turning-point in the evolution of Psychoanalysis: many -- particularly feminists knowledgeable with what went down here -- would say that Freud basically abandoned women -- abandoned alleged female victims of childhood sexual assault -- and turned Psychoanalysis into a much more 'chauvanist men's club' that suppressed and distorted all evidence of childhood sexual assaults under the guise of 'childhood and adolescent sexual fantasy' -- most particulary, relative to a girl's love for her father.
I remember running into this issue for the first time when I picked up Masson's controversial book in the mid to late 1980s, 'The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory' (1984, 1985, 1992). I even remember contacting Mr. Masson in New Zealand by email -- years after he had broken away (and/or been banished) from numerous psychoanalytic societies that he had belonged to (the International Psychoanalytical Association, the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society, the Toronto Psychoanalytic Society, and I believe, the San Francisico Psychonalytic Society. Cited from another of Masson's books, 'Final Analysis: The Making and Unmaking of a Psychoanalyst', 1990,1991.)
My first email to Masson was responded to by Masson with reasonable warmth as he wished me good luck in my work but still he did not wish to re-hash the Seduction Theory Controversy. My second email to him was not treated as warmly -- understandable I suppose in light of all the grief he had taken during those years, and/or also my lack of 'sufficient professional' credentials on the same subject manner.
Now here is the point I wish to make. As much as I loved reading 'Final Analysis' and 'The Assault on Truth' and Janet Malcolm's 'In The Freud Archives'(1983,84), and I probably side closer to Masson's last published points of view, and Freud's pre-1897 point of view rather than Freud's evolving post-1897 point of view: still, most memories -- plain and simple -- from an 'objective' epistemological point of view, cannot be fully or often even at all significantly trusted.
Let us just look at the anectdotal evidence we have here. It has been at least 15 years since I last theoretically invested any time and energy into this remarkable controversy, so excuse me if my own memory is a little rusty here: I said that I picked up Masson's book, 'The Assault on Truth' in the mid to late 1980s. Wrong! I just fished the book out of my personal library here, dusted off the cobwebs, and found out that the last publication date on the book was 1992. That means that I obviously bought the book sometime in or after 1992 but I 'remembered' it to be in the mid to late 1980s. So much for my memory. I read all three of those books that I just cited above but do I remember which book I read when, and in which order, and how far apart the readings were? I am obviously more than a little suspicious of my own memory at this point. Logically speaking, I would imagine I read 'Assault' first, then 'Final Analysis', then Malcolm's 'In the Freud Archives'. But don't quote me on that -- and I certainly would not want to put my hand on a bible in a court of law because if I did, I would probably have to say simply, 'I don't know'. Do I remember what year it was that I emailed Masson in New Zealand. He was working on 'animal psychology', I believe, by that point in time. (Certainly less stressful than 'human psychology' -- especially when it comes to the subject of 'sex' and 'sexuality'.) Maybe one day I will find the email in my own archives here with a date attached to it. But other than that I can only guess that it was somewhere around 1995-97. Again, don't quote me on that because my memory right now is not holding up to the test. It is certainly flawed.
Do I at least partly make my point? A therapist has no right to totally or even necessarily partly trust' the 'objective epistemological correctness' of any memory that a client cites to him or her for the simple reason that it is a 'memory' and memories can easily fail, distort, embellish, discard...in short, they are very narcissistically biased'. To trust a memory in a court of law -- without substantiating empirical evidence and other credible witness reports is downright ludicrous -- putting a man (i.e., it is usually but not always a man who is being accused when it comes to issues of 'past childhood sexual assaults') in jail on the basis of the unsubstantiated memories and testimony of an alleged victim is hugely dangerous and I would even say ethically and legally reprehensible unless these memories and testimony are otherwise substantiated. (And as far as 'narcissistic bias', let us not forget that you have lawyers who are functioning like 'pre-Socratic Sophist mercenaries' who are paid handsomely to deliver fancy rhetoric and persuasive logic that is designed to narcissistically serve their clients goals and wishes regardless of how close or how far their clients' goals and wishes are connected to any form of 'objective, epistemological truth'.
We have come full circle and the epistemological and legal dangers that Freud ran into in the mid to late 1890s when he started to have second thoughts, and then abandon, his infamous Seduction Theory, are as real and dangerous today as they were back then. 'Subjective clinical-therapy memories' have no business being called 'epistemological truths' -- regardless of how 'epistemologically real' they may seem. The same point needs to be made with a hundred times more force when we start to talk about an alleged 'unconscious' and/or 'reconstructed' memory. None of these memories should have any legal force in a court of law unless they can be 'empirically substantiated beyond any reasonable doubt' by other much more credible and stronger forms of evidence. And this does not mean a woman's 'psychological/emotional/physical symptoms' or a psychologist's so-called professional testimony.
Psychologists and psychiatrists can be hugely narcissistically biased simply by the orientation of their training. Who's giving the testimony -- an orthodox, Oedipal Complex believing, Psychoanalyst? Or a 21st century feminist psychologist who may have been sexually assaulted herself and who may be projecting her own situation onto her client (in Psychoanalysis this is called 'counter-transference') and 'subconsciously looking' for evidence of a sexual assault in her client in practically every symptom that she portrays, and in every memory, conscious or unconscious, legitimately told to her or 'interpretively reconstructed' by the therapist. This presents a huge 'epistemological and ethical danger' not only to psychotherapy in general -- regardless of psychological orientation, orthodox Psychoanalytic or the opposite -- but even more so once this whole psychological and epistemological charade moves into a court of law.
Do I believe that guilty men should be held accountable for their 'sexual assaults'? Of course, I do -- if they can be legitimately proven in a court of law -- and allowing for the fact that there is a very big difference between 'inappropriately making a pass at a woman' and 'rape'. They should not be treated the same -- and even as I speak there are many men terrified of making a pass at a woman, even having sex with a woman for the first time without the petrifiying thought that she could ruin his life just by 'turning on him' the next morning.
The laws for 'sexual assault' and nowadays 'domestic assault' are getting broader and broader, with less and less 'empirical evidence' needed to get a legal conviction.
In effect, this means that we are now getting more and more of the opposite kind of problem than we used to have. Now, instead of far too many men get away with serious sexual crimes that they should have been convicted of with significant sentences, now we are convicting men and throwing men into jail left, right, and centre, on the basis of laws that are narcissistically biased in favor of women and on the basis of 'narcissistically biased evidence' that would never have been considered 'empirical evidence' back before our domestic and sexual assault laws started to change.
In effect, the Seduction Theory rules again in North American law -- whether we are talking about recent adult or childhood memories -- with or without any kind of 'legitimate supporting empirical and/or witness evidence'. North American domestic law used to be narcissistically biased in favor of men. Now it is narcissisically biased in favor of women.
As if women are incapable of lying, manipulating evidence, embellishing and distorting facts, creating false testimony, making themselves out to be 'angels' and 'victims', noncapable of violence themselves of course, non-capable of 'instigating trouble', or 'retaliating to rejection' or 'seducing men in their own right'...all of these potential complications to the 'epistemological truth' in both a psychotherapist's office and even more so in a court of law go out the window in today's North American world of 'feminine -- and feminist -- overprotection'.
So how in the name of God or Zeus or Apollo could Freud give any pretense to 'finding epistemological memory truth' in his clinical office in 1895 when in 2007 we are no further ahead -- epistemologically poisoned equally from both sides by an overbelief in both Freud and/or the opposite pro-feminist, anti-Freud point of view on 'memories' and 'unsubtantiated narcissistcally biased, one-sided testimony'. 'Memories' and 'unsubstantiated, narcissistically biased, one-sided testimony' need to be thrown out of all courts of law until this whole 'epistemological and ethical mess' is put back into proper balanced perspective. Right now our domestic courts are making a mockery of the name 'justice'. Both Freud's Seduction Theory and his Childhood Sexuality and Oedipal Complex theories were one-sidedly biased but today in our domestic courts of law we are all seeing the evidence of his 'Seduction Theory Gone Mad'...
What is it -- something like 70 to 90 of all men in jail now are there on 'domestic crimes'. Where are all the women filling up the women's jails? I don't see the same problem in the women's jails these days. What does that mean? Women don't know how to throw a punch? Push a man? Grab a man by the ear? Throw a piece of furniture at a man? Seduce a man -- or consent to being seduced by a man -- and then 'flip' the next day when she has sobred up or things didn't turn out exactly the way she wanted them to?
The epistemological, ethical, and legal problem that we are facing today -- as originally uncovered at least partly by Freud in the 1890s -- is at least partly this: Is it better to 'have not enough men in jail who have committed sexual and/or domestic assault'? Or is it better to 'throw too many men in jail who are not guilty of the crimes they allegedly committed and/or are being punished for crimes that their accusers were at least equally guilty of -- and who are getting off scott free with no tarnishment of their legal reputations.' Why should a democratic law that is supposed to be equal to all citizens, male and female, black and white, have an overt and/or covert 'threshold of guilt' that is obviously very low when it comes to transgressions committed by a man against a woman, and so high when it comes to transgressions committed by a woman against a man. And that is amongst those transgressions committed by women that even make it to a court of law. Most of them are either not reported, and/or if they are reported, they are not taken seriously by police unless the evidence is overwhelming.
So from a psychotherapeutic and clinical point of view, the problem then becomes this: where do we find a 'workable bridge' between Freud's 'Traumacy-Seduction Theory' and his later 'Childhood Sexuality and Oedipal Complex' theories. Or put another way -- between 'Traumacy Theory' and 'Narcissistic (Compensation) Theory'.
I will leave you with this theoretical and practical problem for now. And that is my take on Freud for today, March 3rd, 2007, and modified on March 5th, 2007, then modified again on Monday January 19th, 2009.
-- dgbn, Jan. 20th, 2009
-- David Gordon Bain
..................................................................................
Psychology and Law: A Critical Introduction
Author(s): Andreas Kapardis
ISBN10: 052182530X
ISBN13: 9780521825306
Format: Hardcover
Pub. Date: 3/3/2003
Publisher(s): Cambridge University Press
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This book provides a comprehensive, up-to-date discussion of contemporary debates at the interface between psychology and criminal law. The topics surveyed include critiques of eyewitness testimony; the jury; sentencing as a human process; the psychologist as expert witness; persuasion in the courtroom; detecting deception; and psychology and the police. Kapardis draws on sources from Europe, North America and Australia to offer an expert investigation of the subjectivity and human fallibility inherent in our system of justice. He also provides suggestions for minimizing undesirable influences on crucial judicial decision-making. First Edition Hb (1997): 0-521-55321-0 First Edition Pb (1997): 0-521-55738-0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This book is the authoritative work for students and professionals in psychology and law.
Freud and Jung -- theirs was an all too short and tumultous seven year relationship (1907-1914), passionate and explosive, reverent from each side at the beginning, much more rebellious from Jung's side as things progressed, often compared to a common father/son type relationship with Freud maintaining his authoritative paternal boundaries and Jung challenging these same boundaries -- eventually to the point of separation, and the building of two separate schools of psychology with partly siimilar, partly different philosophies and conceptualizations concerning human psychology. They both shared a partly Hegelian, partly Nietzschean philosophy. Freud was more a product of the Enlightenment, Jung a product of Romantic Philosophy. Jung seemed a little more willing to integrate the 'darker side' of human nature in a productive manner with the rest of man's personality, whereas Freud seemed more about 'rationally analyzing' this same dark side with the goal 'of bringing it under more rational, conscious, enlightened control -- but control none the less. Jung was willing to give up more of this control with a trust things would eventually integrate in a more healthy direction. This was one of the main dialectical splits or differences in opinion between Enlightenment and Romantic Philosophy -- just how much reason was man willing to give up and trust that man would still land back on firm ground again -- after some kind of a 'romantic flight' to who knows where.
Jung was more the mythologist, mystic, astrology, occult and para-normal psychologist. Freud didn't seem too comfortable following Jung into these areas. It just happens to be my birthday today -- Jung might be more apt to make a psychological interpretation in this regard, as I try to mediate between Freud and Jung, although I am just speculating here. Besides, if he wouldn't I will.
March 3rd. My birthday. I am a pisces -- often equated with 'two fish swimming towards each other and away from each other at the same time'(or not knowing which way to swim while wanting to swim both ways at the same time). Towards intimacy and committment. And/or away from intimacy and committment and towards more 'individual freedom and self-expression'.
How appropriate that Freud and Jung should meet together for the first time on this 'dualistic and 'dialectic' day. Two very strong-willed and creative men each doing their absolutely very best to 'will to power' their own separate vision and creation while admiring, respecting and learning from each other at the same time. Or at least in the beginning. Until their respective creative visions came into conflict with each other -- and this conflict became stronger and stronger, reaching more and more of an impasse that just would not go away. And then the anger and resentment started to seriously set in and put a fast ending to what had started out as such a strong and passionate relationship with Freud wanting to pass the 'metaphorical Psychoanalytic torch to Jung as his heir-in-waiting. But it was not to be. Psychoanalysis -- at least as Freud defined and described it -- was just too tight a 'theoretical box' for Jung to accept and live with. Jung needed a significantly different theoretical box that he could create himself, accept because it was his -- and thrive in.
And her is me -- a creative post-Hegelian, post-Nietzschean philosophical and psychological Pisces, trying my hardest to create the ultimate multi-dualistic and dialectical philosophy-psychology of all time. Including Freud and Jung who I have both borrowed from their respective 'theoretical boxes' (including Freud's four theoretical boxes: 'unconscious memory-traumacy theory', 'unconscious memory-seduction theory', 'Oedipal theory-childhood sexuality theory', and 'life and death instinct theory'. Perhaps you could even include the beginning of 'Object Relations' as Freud's fifth theory or conversely call this Melanie Klein's theory since she was the one who really grabbed a hold of this last theory and ran with it.)
DGBN Philosophy-Pscyhology -- the multi-dialectic bridge between any and all human differences, splits, conflicts, and paradoxes. Ideally, anyway, if not in reality. Some people just do not want to compromise and/or integrate their differences. They want the whole cake and eat it too. For these people, there are no compromises, no negotiations, no integrations. Just a very strong 'will to power' -- and how far that gets them either rhetorically and/or by exploitation, manipulation, bribery, blackmail, seduction, force and/or violence.
DGBN Philosophy-Psychology -- most importantly for our purposes here -- a philosphical and psychological dialectical bridge between the abyss of Freud and Jung.
But first, let us talk about a dialectical bridge beween Freud before and after his short little essay, 'Screen Memories' (1899), the major turning point between his 'pre-psychoanalytic traumatic and seduction theories' and his soon-to-be 'Psychoanalysis-proper' as trumpeted by the publication of his famous book, 'The Interpretation of Dreams' (1900).
Much has been made of this controversial theoretical and clinical turning-point in the evolution of Psychoanalysis: many -- particularly feminists knowledgeable with what went down here -- would say that Freud basically abandoned women -- abandoned alleged female victims of childhood sexual assault -- and turned Psychoanalysis into a much more 'chauvanist men's club' that suppressed and distorted all evidence of childhood sexual assaults under the guise of 'childhood and adolescent sexual fantasy' -- most particulary, relative to a girl's love for her father.
I remember running into this issue for the first time when I picked up Masson's controversial book in the mid to late 1980s, 'The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory' (1984, 1985, 1992). I even remember contacting Mr. Masson in New Zealand by email -- years after he had broken away (and/or been banished) from numerous psychoanalytic societies that he had belonged to (the International Psychoanalytical Association, the Canadian Psychoanalytic Society, the Toronto Psychoanalytic Society, and I believe, the San Francisico Psychonalytic Society. Cited from another of Masson's books, 'Final Analysis: The Making and Unmaking of a Psychoanalyst', 1990,1991.)
My first email to Masson was responded to by Masson with reasonable warmth as he wished me good luck in my work but still he did not wish to re-hash the Seduction Theory Controversy. My second email to him was not treated as warmly -- understandable I suppose in light of all the grief he had taken during those years, and/or also my lack of 'sufficient professional' credentials on the same subject manner.
Now here is the point I wish to make. As much as I loved reading 'Final Analysis' and 'The Assault on Truth' and Janet Malcolm's 'In The Freud Archives'(1983,84), and I probably side closer to Masson's last published points of view, and Freud's pre-1897 point of view rather than Freud's evolving post-1897 point of view: still, most memories -- plain and simple -- from an 'objective' epistemological point of view, cannot be fully or often even at all significantly trusted.
Let us just look at the anectdotal evidence we have here. It has been at least 15 years since I last theoretically invested any time and energy into this remarkable controversy, so excuse me if my own memory is a little rusty here: I said that I picked up Masson's book, 'The Assault on Truth' in the mid to late 1980s. Wrong! I just fished the book out of my personal library here, dusted off the cobwebs, and found out that the last publication date on the book was 1992. That means that I obviously bought the book sometime in or after 1992 but I 'remembered' it to be in the mid to late 1980s. So much for my memory. I read all three of those books that I just cited above but do I remember which book I read when, and in which order, and how far apart the readings were? I am obviously more than a little suspicious of my own memory at this point. Logically speaking, I would imagine I read 'Assault' first, then 'Final Analysis', then Malcolm's 'In the Freud Archives'. But don't quote me on that -- and I certainly would not want to put my hand on a bible in a court of law because if I did, I would probably have to say simply, 'I don't know'. Do I remember what year it was that I emailed Masson in New Zealand. He was working on 'animal psychology', I believe, by that point in time. (Certainly less stressful than 'human psychology' -- especially when it comes to the subject of 'sex' and 'sexuality'.) Maybe one day I will find the email in my own archives here with a date attached to it. But other than that I can only guess that it was somewhere around 1995-97. Again, don't quote me on that because my memory right now is not holding up to the test. It is certainly flawed.
Do I at least partly make my point? A therapist has no right to totally or even necessarily partly trust' the 'objective epistemological correctness' of any memory that a client cites to him or her for the simple reason that it is a 'memory' and memories can easily fail, distort, embellish, discard...in short, they are very narcissistically biased'. To trust a memory in a court of law -- without substantiating empirical evidence and other credible witness reports is downright ludicrous -- putting a man (i.e., it is usually but not always a man who is being accused when it comes to issues of 'past childhood sexual assaults') in jail on the basis of the unsubstantiated memories and testimony of an alleged victim is hugely dangerous and I would even say ethically and legally reprehensible unless these memories and testimony are otherwise substantiated. (And as far as 'narcissistic bias', let us not forget that you have lawyers who are functioning like 'pre-Socratic Sophist mercenaries' who are paid handsomely to deliver fancy rhetoric and persuasive logic that is designed to narcissistically serve their clients goals and wishes regardless of how close or how far their clients' goals and wishes are connected to any form of 'objective, epistemological truth'.
We have come full circle and the epistemological and legal dangers that Freud ran into in the mid to late 1890s when he started to have second thoughts, and then abandon, his infamous Seduction Theory, are as real and dangerous today as they were back then. 'Subjective clinical-therapy memories' have no business being called 'epistemological truths' -- regardless of how 'epistemologically real' they may seem. The same point needs to be made with a hundred times more force when we start to talk about an alleged 'unconscious' and/or 'reconstructed' memory. None of these memories should have any legal force in a court of law unless they can be 'empirically substantiated beyond any reasonable doubt' by other much more credible and stronger forms of evidence. And this does not mean a woman's 'psychological/emotional/physical symptoms' or a psychologist's so-called professional testimony.
Psychologists and psychiatrists can be hugely narcissistically biased simply by the orientation of their training. Who's giving the testimony -- an orthodox, Oedipal Complex believing, Psychoanalyst? Or a 21st century feminist psychologist who may have been sexually assaulted herself and who may be projecting her own situation onto her client (in Psychoanalysis this is called 'counter-transference') and 'subconsciously looking' for evidence of a sexual assault in her client in practically every symptom that she portrays, and in every memory, conscious or unconscious, legitimately told to her or 'interpretively reconstructed' by the therapist. This presents a huge 'epistemological and ethical danger' not only to psychotherapy in general -- regardless of psychological orientation, orthodox Psychoanalytic or the opposite -- but even more so once this whole psychological and epistemological charade moves into a court of law.
Do I believe that guilty men should be held accountable for their 'sexual assaults'? Of course, I do -- if they can be legitimately proven in a court of law -- and allowing for the fact that there is a very big difference between 'inappropriately making a pass at a woman' and 'rape'. They should not be treated the same -- and even as I speak there are many men terrified of making a pass at a woman, even having sex with a woman for the first time without the petrifiying thought that she could ruin his life just by 'turning on him' the next morning.
The laws for 'sexual assault' and nowadays 'domestic assault' are getting broader and broader, with less and less 'empirical evidence' needed to get a legal conviction.
In effect, this means that we are now getting more and more of the opposite kind of problem than we used to have. Now, instead of far too many men get away with serious sexual crimes that they should have been convicted of with significant sentences, now we are convicting men and throwing men into jail left, right, and centre, on the basis of laws that are narcissistically biased in favor of women and on the basis of 'narcissistically biased evidence' that would never have been considered 'empirical evidence' back before our domestic and sexual assault laws started to change.
In effect, the Seduction Theory rules again in North American law -- whether we are talking about recent adult or childhood memories -- with or without any kind of 'legitimate supporting empirical and/or witness evidence'. North American domestic law used to be narcissistically biased in favor of men. Now it is narcissisically biased in favor of women.
As if women are incapable of lying, manipulating evidence, embellishing and distorting facts, creating false testimony, making themselves out to be 'angels' and 'victims', noncapable of violence themselves of course, non-capable of 'instigating trouble', or 'retaliating to rejection' or 'seducing men in their own right'...all of these potential complications to the 'epistemological truth' in both a psychotherapist's office and even more so in a court of law go out the window in today's North American world of 'feminine -- and feminist -- overprotection'.
So how in the name of God or Zeus or Apollo could Freud give any pretense to 'finding epistemological memory truth' in his clinical office in 1895 when in 2007 we are no further ahead -- epistemologically poisoned equally from both sides by an overbelief in both Freud and/or the opposite pro-feminist, anti-Freud point of view on 'memories' and 'unsubtantiated narcissistcally biased, one-sided testimony'. 'Memories' and 'unsubstantiated, narcissistically biased, one-sided testimony' need to be thrown out of all courts of law until this whole 'epistemological and ethical mess' is put back into proper balanced perspective. Right now our domestic courts are making a mockery of the name 'justice'. Both Freud's Seduction Theory and his Childhood Sexuality and Oedipal Complex theories were one-sidedly biased but today in our domestic courts of law we are all seeing the evidence of his 'Seduction Theory Gone Mad'...
What is it -- something like 70 to 90 of all men in jail now are there on 'domestic crimes'. Where are all the women filling up the women's jails? I don't see the same problem in the women's jails these days. What does that mean? Women don't know how to throw a punch? Push a man? Grab a man by the ear? Throw a piece of furniture at a man? Seduce a man -- or consent to being seduced by a man -- and then 'flip' the next day when she has sobred up or things didn't turn out exactly the way she wanted them to?
The epistemological, ethical, and legal problem that we are facing today -- as originally uncovered at least partly by Freud in the 1890s -- is at least partly this: Is it better to 'have not enough men in jail who have committed sexual and/or domestic assault'? Or is it better to 'throw too many men in jail who are not guilty of the crimes they allegedly committed and/or are being punished for crimes that their accusers were at least equally guilty of -- and who are getting off scott free with no tarnishment of their legal reputations.' Why should a democratic law that is supposed to be equal to all citizens, male and female, black and white, have an overt and/or covert 'threshold of guilt' that is obviously very low when it comes to transgressions committed by a man against a woman, and so high when it comes to transgressions committed by a woman against a man. And that is amongst those transgressions committed by women that even make it to a court of law. Most of them are either not reported, and/or if they are reported, they are not taken seriously by police unless the evidence is overwhelming.
So from a psychotherapeutic and clinical point of view, the problem then becomes this: where do we find a 'workable bridge' between Freud's 'Traumacy-Seduction Theory' and his later 'Childhood Sexuality and Oedipal Complex' theories. Or put another way -- between 'Traumacy Theory' and 'Narcissistic (Compensation) Theory'.
I will leave you with this theoretical and practical problem for now. And that is my take on Freud for today, March 3rd, 2007, and modified on March 5th, 2007, then modified again on Monday January 19th, 2009.
-- dgbn, Jan. 20th, 2009
-- David Gordon Bain
..................................................................................
Psychology and Law: A Critical Introduction
Author(s): Andreas Kapardis
ISBN10: 052182530X
ISBN13: 9780521825306
Format: Hardcover
Pub. Date: 3/3/2003
Publisher(s): Cambridge University Press
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This book provides a comprehensive, up-to-date discussion of contemporary debates at the interface between psychology and criminal law. The topics surveyed include critiques of eyewitness testimony; the jury; sentencing as a human process; the psychologist as expert witness; persuasion in the courtroom; detecting deception; and psychology and the police. Kapardis draws on sources from Europe, North America and Australia to offer an expert investigation of the subjectivity and human fallibility inherent in our system of justice. He also provides suggestions for minimizing undesirable influences on crucial judicial decision-making. First Edition Hb (1997): 0-521-55321-0 First Edition Pb (1997): 0-521-55738-0
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This book is the authoritative work for students and professionals in psychology and law.
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